



**Director of
Central
Intelligence**

~~**Top Secret**~~

25X1

OCPAS/CIG

CY# 285

National Intelligence Daily

*Saturday
12 November 1983*

~~**Top Secret**~~

CPAS NID 83-265JX

12 November 1983

Copy **285**

25X1

Page Denied

Top Secret

25X1

Contents

USSR-Syria: Foreign Ministers' Meeting	1
Lebanon: Gemayel To Visit Damascus	2
USSR: Statement on Arms Control Talks	3

North Yemen: Worsening Economic Prospects	5
--	----------

El Salvador: Political and Military Developments	8
Chile: Opposition Rally Planned	9

Grenada: Interim Government	10
Peru: Municipal Elections	11
USSR-Western Europe: Bid To Influence INF Debates	11

Special Analysis

USSR: Problems and Prospects of a New Succession	12
---	-----------

Top Secret

25X1

25X1

12 November 1983

Top Secret

25X1

USSR-SYRIA: Foreign Ministers' Meeting

Soviet and Syrian media coverage of the meetings in Moscow between Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam, which ended yesterday, suggests frank discussion of Syria's pressure on PLO leader Arafat and continuing concern by both sides about US military intentions in Lebanon. []

25X1

TASS noted that the two men reviewed the situation in Tripoli, Lebanon, where Arafat's forces are under siege by Syrian-backed PLO rebels. Gromyko in a speech yesterday described as "urgent" the need to end strife within the Palestinian movement and called for greater Arab unity. []

25X1

The Soviet Foreign Minister also accused the US and Israel of planning "aggressive intrigues" against Lebanon and repeated the warning against armed interference there that Moscow first issued in an official TASS statement on 4 November. He added that pressure is also being exerted on Syria. []

25X1

Syrian media coverage of the talks yesterday omitted the Soviet call for Arab solidarity. []

25X1

Comment: The remarks by Gromyko suggest that, while the Soviets have made clear their displeasure with Syria's attempt to defeat Arafat, they nonetheless do not want the issue to harm bilateral ties. Gromyko is the first Soviet leader to repeat the earlier TASS warning against US military action in Lebanon, although he made it less direct by not specifically mentioning Washington. []

25X1

The Soviet Foreign Minister did not claim that the US plans military action against the Syrians or their forces in Lebanon. In addition, he did not express support for Syria or say what the USSR's reaction would be to a US military move. Moscow's reluctance to offer explicit public backing for Damascus reflects its concern that an outbreak of fighting would lead to Syrian pressure for direct Soviet military assistance, which the USSR still appears reluctant to provide. []

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

12 November 1983

Top Secret

25X1

LEBANON: Gemayel To Visit Damascus

President Gemayel reportedly plans to meet with Syrian President Assad for the first time on Monday.

25X1
25X1

Press reports indicate Gemayel will spend two days in Damascus before going to Saudi Arabia later in the week. The Israeli Foreign Ministry informed the US that the Lebanese Government had confirmed Gemayel's trip and had urgently requested a meeting this weekend of US, Lebanese, and Israeli officials.

25X1
25X1

Comment: Gemayel probably will try to persuade Assad to drop Syria's demands that Lebanon abrogate its accord with Israel. The Lebanese President almost certainly recognizes that his planned visits to Washington and to West European capitals will not result in a new formula for Israeli withdrawal. He therefore believes he must soften the position of the Syrians and their Lebanese allies if the reconciliation process is to continue in Lebanon.

25X1

Assad, however, is unlikely to compromise in his demands for a complete Israeli withdrawal. Moreover, Gemayel's visit to Damascus probably will heighten Israeli and Lebanese Christian suspicions that he might give in to opposition demands.

25X1
25X1**Top Secret**

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

USSR: Statement on Arms Control Talks

The announcement by the Soviets yesterday that they will break off INF talks if the West German Bundestag approves the deployment of new US missiles is the first public declaration by Moscow that it views the debate in Bonn as decisive to the future of the negotiations.

25X1

A statement issued by the Soviet Embassy in Bonn cautioned that the fate of the INF talks depends on the outcome of the Bundestag debate on 21 and 22 November. The statement alluded to General Secretary Andropov's warning late last month that arrival of new US missiles in Western Europe would make continuation of negotiations in Geneva impossible. On Wednesday, a Soviet delegate to the INF talks—speaking “for the sake of argument”—had said that any resumption of arms control talks would be on a different basis, with a “global” approach.

25X1

A Soviet delegate to the MBFR negotiations in Vienna, meanwhile, said at the plenary meeting on Thursday that INF deployment will have a negative effect on the MBFR talks as well. The US delegation reports that his language was more threatening than that used in a similar statement by the East on 13 October. According to an Eastern delegate, a high-level Warsaw Pact meeting later this month will consider the future of MBFR in the wake of INF deployments.

25X1

Comment: The specific reference in the Soviet Embassy statement to the INF talks suggests that the USSR has not yet decided also to walk out on other negotiations, such as START. The Soviet official in Geneva who hinted that the talks might resume had previously been the most pessimistic member of his delegation concerning the effect of INF deployments. His remark may signal that Moscow is considering a somewhat early resumption of INF negotiations in a different forum, perhaps by including them in START.

25X1

Despite the warning in Vienna, the Soviets are less likely to break off MBFR talks.

25X1

Top Secret

12 November 1983

25X1

Page Denied

Top Secret

25X1

NORTH YEMEN: Worsening Economic Prospects

The failure of President Salih's government to obtain increased foreign economic assistance may result in a serious loss of popular and military support. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

Inadequate revenues have already forced Sanaa to abandon its budget goals for 1983 and to cut back imports. The prices of many goods, including foodstuffs, are rising sharply, according to the US Embassy. [REDACTED]

25X1

Business hoarding and panic buying among consumers have made the situation worse. Earnings from abroad—virtually all from worker remittances—are declining, and foreign exchange reserves are almost exhausted. [REDACTED]

25X1

Comment: Without increased foreign help, the government will have to impose more stringent austerity measures, which will affect social programs and consumer subsidies. The regime still must cope with the massive rebuilding costs resulting from the earthquake of last December. [REDACTED]

25X1

North Yemen's worsening economic situation will provide opportunities for Islamic fundamentalist groups and leftist National Democratic Front insurgents seeking to foment unrest. The biggest risk is that dissatisfaction will spread to the military, Salih's main source of power, if he cannot meet the Army payroll or cuts back on subventions to key commanders. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Page Denied

Next 4 Page(s) In Document Denied

Top Secret

25X1

EL SALVADOR: Political and Military Developments

The Constituent Assembly has agreed temporarily to drop consideration of the contentious agrarian reform articles of the constitution, and the military situation remains essentially unchanged.

25X1

The Assembly spent about a month deliberating the agrarian reform articles without reaching an agreement. The political parties were unable to agree on the amount of acreage that should be subject to future land reform. The US Embassy reports that Assembly leaders do not anticipate additional problems, however, and that they expect to complete the remaining articles by the end of the month.

25X1

25X1

Comment: The slow progress on the constitution—along with recent publicity about death-squad activities and the continued military stalemate—apparently has contributed to a growing belief in San Salvador that the elections scheduled for early next year may have to be postponed. The Assembly will have to move rapidly to complete ratification and pass new electoral laws to avoid a postponement.

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

CHILE: Opposition Rally Planned

Plans for a massive opposition rally on 18 November and increased terrorist activities reflect new efforts by antigovernment forces to extract political concessions, but President Pinochet seems increasingly determined to resist. [redacted]

25X1

Declining support for recent and sometimes hastily scheduled "days of protest" has prompted the opposition Democratic Alliance to plan more carefully for the demonstration in Santiago. Christian Democratic Party organizers have scheduled an evening rally, in which labor and radical leftist activists may participate. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

[redacted] most Communist-led groups have been disappointed by the recent poor response to their individual protest efforts, including a proposed call for a national strike. [redacted]

25X1

Other Communists, however, are opposed to peaceful protests. Santiago police report that the "Zero Front"—a new 60-member terrorist group of Communist and other Marxist activists—has killed two policemen and carried out several bombings. [redacted]

25X1

Political talks between the Alliance and Interior Minister Jarpa have been suspended since early last month, and the opposition reportedly has increasing doubts about the Interior Minister's objectives and survivability. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Comment: There have been several signs in recent weeks that Pinochet is uneasy over Jarpa's growing power and may replace him as soon as his skills and credibility are no longer needed. If Jarpa is dismissed or quits, however, prospects for political dialogue would fade even further, because many Chileans would question the government's intentions. A large, peaceful rally would give the Alliance renewed confidence for talks with the government, but a low turnout could be a major setback for the opposition. [redacted]

25X1


25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret

25X1



25X1

GRENADA: Interim Government

Governor General Scoon's recent measures resemble the repressive tactics of former Prime Minister Bishop's regime, but they may be intended only to control the immediate security situation. Under the authority of the Grenadian constitution, Scoon last week declared a state of emergency, banned most public meetings, authorized arrests without warrants, and warned of press censorship. He established a judicial tribunal to implement these regulations and this week formed a nine-member advisory council of Grenadian-born nonpartisan senior technocrats to act as an interim government. The council's mandate includes planning a security force to replace US troops, the establishment of a nonpolitical Grenadian police, and preparations for general elections next year. [REDACTED]

25X1

Comment: Scoon may want to use a heavy hand to retain stability until an effective and loyal police force can be installed. If the state of emergency continues over a longer period, however, the measures probably will provoke public discontent, criticism from democratic nations and expatriates, and further propaganda from international leftists. [REDACTED]

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

PERU: Municipal Elections

The governing party is likely to suffer losses in nationwide municipal elections tomorrow, reflecting widespread discontent with the economic and counterterrorist policies of President Belaunde. Although many voters remain undecided, most polls show that the principal opposition party, the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance, leads in the Lima mayoral race. The US Embassy reports that another opposition group, the United Left coalition, has campaigned effectively in Lima and in major municipalities of the south to offset the antileftist backlash against increasing terrorism.

25X1

Comment: Significant municipal losses would further weaken Belaunde's credibility and political base and could lead to a presidential victory by the opposition in 1985. Substantial leftist gains would further undermine the military's confidence in civilian rule.

25X1

25X1

USSR-WESTERN EUROPE: Bid To Influence INF Debates

The Soviet-sponsored Second Vienna Dialogue for Disarmament and Detente opens on Monday. Invitations have been issued to the West German Greens, West European Socialists and Communists, members of the European Parliament, and the US nuclear freeze movement. The first Vienna dialogue in 1982 attracted 300 delegates. The event will be hosted by the International Liaison Forum of Peace Forces, a front organization of the CPSU Central Committee's International Department closely associated with the World Peace Council.

25X1

Comment: The Vienna meeting is intended to rally antinuclear activists and to influence current debates in West European parliaments on INF deployments. Moscow also is calculating that the presence of independent peace groups and personalities will enable the Soviets to portray opposition to INF as broader than it is. It is doubtful, however, that they can change the outcome of the parliamentary debates favoring deployment.

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Succession Frontrunners**Mikhail Gorbachev**

Position:
Central Committee
Secretary

Responsibilities:
Personnel appointments
and agro-industrial sector

Age:
52

Advantages: Andropov's choice, high visibility, recently expanded responsibilities, Central Committee clout

Liabilities: Junior, limited experience, probably lacks military and defense-industrial support

Prospect: Andropov's continuity candidate

**Grigoriy Romanov**

Position:
Central Committee
Secretary

Responsibilities:
Heavy and defense-related
industry

Age:
60

Advantages: Administrative experience, probable support of defense sector, image of toughness

Liabilities: Ambitions threaten other leaders, lacks central party experience

Prospect: Ideologically conservative candidate

**Konstantin Chernenko**

Position:
Central Committee
Secretary

Responsibilities:
Ideology

Age:
72

Advantages: Unofficial second in command

Liabilities: Passed over once before, not fully trusted, ill health

Prospect: Compromise candidate

**Dmitriy Ustinov**

Position:
Defense Minister

Responsibilities:
Military Affairs

Age:
75

Advantages: Past experience in Secretariat, military backing

Liabilities: Age and ill health

Prospect: Interim leadership candidate

301162 11-83

25X1

Top Secret

12 November 1983

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Special Analysis

USSR: Problems and Prospects of a New Succession

General Secretary Andropov's absence from the anniversary ceremonies in Moscow this year—no general secretary has missed them in 30 years—has given rise to speculation that the regime could face a new succession at any time. []

25X1

The Soviets have good reason to be concerned over the issue. Although Yuriy Andropov has been party chief for only a year, his advanced age and uncertain health have raised questions among Soviets and Westerners alike about the length of his tenure. The illness that prevented Andropov from attending the revolution ceremonies early this month points to the Soviet leadership predicament. []

25X1

Andropov took office at age 68, almost 10 years later in life than any of his predecessors. Concern about his physical status began the day of Brezhnev's funeral and has heightened since. []

25X1

Last June, Finnish officials were surprised that Andropov was permitted to make an appearance before the foreign press that highlighted his poor condition. A long-scheduled meeting with West German Chancellor Kohl had to be delayed. His 12-week absence from public view since late summer, and the postponement of a planned trip to Bulgaria, a Warsaw Pact summit, and the fall meetings of the Central Committee and Supreme Soviet all contributed to doubts about Andropov's health. []

25X1

The official explanation that Andropov has a "cold" is clearly an understatement of the problem, but the specific nature of his ailment remains carefully concealed. A Soviet Embassy officer in Belgrade passed along a story that Andropov had diabetes. At another time, however, the source said Andropov had kidney trouble. []

25X1

A Radio Moscow official told US Embassy officers that Andropov's health was not good and that he had kidney trouble. This week a US Embassy source in Rome said Andropov had a heart seizure during kidney surgery, and that he is on dialysis. []

25X1

*continued***Top Secret**

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

At the same time, sickness, death, and the consequences of earlier political battles have so reduced leadership ranks that the regime appears less prepared for a new succession than it was when Brezhnev died last year. The party now has the smallest Politburo since the early 1950s, and there is no leader in the Secretariat who has experience comparable to that of Khrushchev, Brezhnev, or even Andropov. []

25X1

As in the past, the succession decision is most likely to be made in the Politburo by the senior corps of remaining leaders. At present, no new succession candidate seems to have a better than 50-50 chance to be selected. This situation strongly suggests that the next succession, if it should occur in the near future, will be more controversial than the last one. []

25X1

The best placed prospects are in the Secretariat. Even candidates in this category—senior secretaries Chernenko, Gorbachev, and Romanov—have significant political liabilities. The lack of ideal candidates could lead the Politburo to turn to others outside the Secretariat, such as Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov. []

25X1

It will be in the Politburo's interest to move quickly in order to avoid conflict and political paralysis and to project an image of decisiveness abroad. Only if the Politburo is unable to reach a consensus would the decision shift to the more than 300-voting-member Central Committee, but this appears unlikely. []

25X1

A new leader would emerge within a matter of days, but he probably would not have the power, authority, and prestige that Andropov had when he gained the post. He would be likely to encounter more difficulty in consolidating his position. As a result, the possibility of protracted turmoil within the leadership cannot be ruled out. []

25X1

After Andropov

Even if the next leader could positively be identified—and Gorbachev and Romanov seem to be frontrunners—his present views insofar as they could be discerned probably would provide only a general sense of the direction Soviet policy would take in the immediate post-Andropov period. These views probably would be modified as he attempted to gain support and even further altered by political calculations, the exigencies of events, and the broader perspective of his new post. Foreign policy specialist Andropov, for instance, has concentrated on economic problems. []

25X1

*continued***Top Secret**

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

As of now, the younger candidates to succeed Andropov—Gorbachev and Romanov—seem to share Andropov's basic domestic policy views. Both men probably view Soviet economic problems as the most important on the domestic agenda. Both are strong advocates of discipline and greater efficiency in labor and production, and both are vigorous leaders who seem open to innovation, experimentation, and change, although within strict ideological bounds. []

25X1

Romanov, an inveterate ideological conservative, cracked down on dissidents as Leningrad leader. Gorbachev, in contrast, at least appears to be more pragmatic and could be more flexible on ideological and social matters. []

25X1

Chernenko's views on Soviet domestic issues are more widely known than those of his younger colleagues in the Secretariat. He has long advocated investment in consumer goods sectors, greater attention to the social factor in domestic affairs, and traditional solutions to economic problems. In recent pronouncements on ideology, however, he has taken a more conservative line. []

25X1

On foreign policy, certain stylistic differences seem apparent within the party Secretariat. Gorbachev, although lacking in foreign policy experience, gave an impression of quiet self-assurance, flexibility, pragmatism, and intelligence during his recent trip to Canada. He hewed closely to the established foreign policy line in both public and private remarks. []

25X1

Romanov, with over 20 trips abroad and fairly wide contact with foreign diplomats over the years, has far greater experience in foreign affairs. He has taken a harder line than Gorbachev in their published statements on foreign policy issues. []

25X1

Romanov's remarks in the foreign policy area have tended to focus on arms control issues, and he seems to take a special interest in US-Soviet relations. While most of his public remarks reflect a hardline, ideological position, in private he has posed on occasion as a partisan of better relations with the US. []

25X1

Chernenko's public remarks during the Brezhnev era were more enthusiastic than those of most other Soviet leaders in his support of improved relations with the West, particularly the US, and of arms limitation. In the crisis atmosphere of an early Andropov succession, however, no new leader could afford to look weak or indecisive, nor could he retreat from any challenge, real or imagined, to Soviet interests abroad. []

25X1

*continued***Top Secret**

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Emphasis on Collective Leadership

If another succession occurs soon, no new leader is likely to have the power, authority, and prestige that Andropov had when he gained the post. Any of the candidates would probably encounter more difficulty in consolidating his position.

25X1

The presence of strong political rivals from the outset—not a problem for Andropov—would make the maneuvering in the Politburo intense and the new general secretary's position more vulnerable. The age structure of the Politburo might allow a younger candidate to consolidate power sooner, as older members die off, but rivalry among younger leaders would intensify.

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret